Immortal Curiosity

Section 1 - Transformation of the Cosmos

Tarnas begins with a sweeping and inspiring overview of the widespread impact of the Copernican Revolution. He focuses on the various philosophical and psychological shifts it implied in the minds of those who accepted it, and that must have been in place in the academic world at large for such a conception to have arisen and eventually gain acceptance. A particular lucid summary of the broadest strokes of this change comes within the second chapter (pg. 9):

For the Coperican hypothesis to be made reasonable, an entirely new conception of “reason” itself had to be forged: new ways of deciding what counts as truth, new ways of recognizing patterns, new forms of evidence, new categories of interpretation, a new understanding of causality. […] The nature of the Copernican revolution was so fundamental that what had to be rethought was not only all the conventional scientific theories but the entire established hierarchy of humanity’s place in the universal scheme of things: its relation to the rest of nature and to the cosmos, its relation to the divine, the basis for its morality, its capacity for certain knowledge, its historical self-understanding.

Fleshing out these necessities, Tarnas presents two faces of the development of Western thought that he will make more and more of as he develops his claims: One aspect is a noble impulse of discovery and achievement, the other is a grim trail of misfortune caused by the same developments prompting the first attitude. The offspring of the Western psyche is not only Beethoven, Shakespeare, and Newton, but also ecological disasters, dysfunctional societies, and listless individual minds.

This is reformulated in more psychological terms. He produces what he calls the “primal world view” (which ends up being rather convenient but is not well established or explained by his description), a worldview which lacks the strong distinction of subject and object (world) that the modern, Western worldview maintains. The latter approach undeniably achieves great power and accuracy, gaining an unprecedented ability to control the world at large, but the price is a “disenchantment” of the world about man, removing the subjectivity that the primal worldview finds in it endogenously. Man gains a new nobility in becoming the sole source of meaning, morality, and intentionality, but the corollary is that he becomes isolated in a meaningless universe. In short “the achievement of human autonomy has been paid for by the experience of human alienation”. Thus it is claimed that while the Copernican revolution provided the supreme vindication of reason and the Western mind, it also planted the seed of a supreme sense of separation from, and disorientation in, the universe at large.

Then comes what seems to be the first primary point in his own argument (pg. 35). He wishes to apply the razor edge of post-modern self-reflection to the assumption at the heart of the negative aspect of the modern Western mind, which leads him to ask: Might the claim that any meaning and purpose the human mind finds in the universe is sourced in the human mind alone be the “final, most global anthropocentric delusion of all”? To claim that any meaning perceived in the universe comes from humanity alone is to privilege it above the entire universe.

Tarnas does not feel that this internal contradiction of the modern worldview can be countered. It requires us to re-examine the world internally and externally, as the old framework falls about us. While I will withold final judgement for now, his claim feels strained at best. He has presented the case of many philosophers, in much shorter exposition, without any of the support. Asking the question is acceptable, but immediately claiming that it cannot be countered is not. It begs so many further questions, of epistemology, of ontology, and countless other topics.

Section 2 - In Search of a Deeper Order

I found the first four paragraphs of this section to be quite abhorrent, even ridiculous. Continuing on, I was greeted by a much more thoughtful and illuminating series of thoughts. The introduction presents an analogy of two suitors vying for the affections of the universe. He goes so far as to ask which the reader believes the universe will unveil its secrets more readily to: The one assuming the universe to be equally intelligent and noble, and seeking to cooperate with it to forge a new synthesis, or the one wishing to use it for his own power and knowledge, granting it no intrinsic value. This comparison is completely groundless and distracting. I encourage the reader to skip over it quickly and continue on.

At this point, Tarnas begins to reveal portions of his theory, using Jung’s concept of synchronicity as an entry point. He discusses astrology more explicitly, and gives a history of its treatment and perception. One of the most helpful things I found here was the idea that astrology’s core concept was not that the planetary motions caused events in the lives of individuals and groups, but rather that there is a systematic, symbolic correspondence between them.

Tarnas then presents an overview of the archetypal character of the planets, through history and in his own research. Thereafter follows a long series of supposed correlations between particular historical events, in the lives of individuals as well as in larger movements, and planetary cycles. While there did seem to be a larger number of correspondences than one would expect, the potential huge number of cases without correspondence, as well as the inexactitude of a number of variables during proposed correspondences left me rather unconvinced.

Beyond this point, I must confess, I have not progressed. I do intend to complete reading the work at some point. Tarnas’ erudition and evident broad studies and reading made for an impressive tome thus far, but my interest waned from two causes: Lack of a true establishment of correspondence, no definite importance of the correspondence even if established. It feels as if he has spent far more time providing example after example of the symbolic correspondence where it might be more enlightening to explore the correspondence in general terms. Simply pointing to more and more examples of a particular conjunction occurring during or before a particular social event did little to convince me of the general principle. And even if I accepted the correspondence, what then? Without an underlying framework, the hypothesis feels rather barren.

Perhaps I will find more in answer to these issues later in the work.